c �i:"'V;� There are, however, few philosophers today who regard this logic as a replacement for classical logic; Putnam may no longer hold that view. [1] Hilary Putnam, whose PhD studies were supervised by Reichenbach, pursued Quine's idea systematically. Logic is not empirical. %PDF-1.4 To justify this claim he cited the so-called paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Reichenbach approached the problem within the philosophical program of the logical positivists. Indeed a sort of analogy had been established in the mid-nineteen thirties by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann between a non-classical propositional logic and some aspects of the measurement process in quantum mechanics. Thus the laws of logic, being paradigmatic cases of analytic propositions, are not immune to revision. In his paper "Is logic empirical?" Guido Bacciagaluppi∗ 26 May 2007 Abstract The philosophical debate about quantum logic between the late 1960s and the early 1980s was generated mainly by Putnam’s claims that quantum mechanics empirically motivates introducing a new form of logic, that such an empirically founded quantum logic is the ‘true’ The idea of a propositional logic with rules radically different from Boolean logic in itself was not new. Dummett's argument is all the more interesting because he is not a proponent of classical logic. Putnam, H. “Is Logic Empirical?” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. �rdJ���1 �`��i�����n'�+�����L
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����\ͪ푸������*��� ��u����'Z. Hence Putnam cannot embrace realism without embracing classical logic, and hence his argument to endorse quantum logic because of realism about quanta is a hopeless case. The classic example of complementarity is illustrated by the double-slit experiment in which a photon can be made to exhibit particle-like properties or wave-like properties, depending on the experimental setup used to detect its presence. That logic came to be known as quantum logic. His solution was a logic of properties with a three-valued semantics; that is each property could have three possible truth-values: true, false or indeterminate. Logic is Not Empirical, Sense 2 (LNE2): The logical consequence relation is e- d fined exclusively in terms of the formal properties of (and formal relations among) objects. Empiricism arises in the isomorphism proposed to connect the mathematical theory with reality. Quine and the foundational studies of Hans Reichenbach, presented in his 1944 book The Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Second, to be able to apply truth tables to describe a connective depends upon distributivity: a truth table is a disjunction of conjunctive possibilities, and the validity of the exercise depends upon the truth of the whole being a consequence of the bivalence of the propositions, which is true only if the principle of distributivity applies. 5, eds. A pair of properties of a system is said to be complementary if each one of them can be assigned a truth value in some experimental setup, but there is no setup which assigns a truth value to both properties. This argument is in favour of the view that the rules of logic are empirical. This, actually, was the correct logic for reasoning about the microscopic world. Consequently intuitionistic logic is privileged over classical logic, when it comes to disputation concerning phenomena whose objective existence is a matter of controversy. Thus the question, "Is logic empirical?," for Dummett, leads naturally into the dispute over bivalence and anti-realism, one of the deepest issues in modern metaphysics. ˔ea+/�*�1����f7`s������
��j���O��H����eN�JsO�IR��OQ�\83(Ұ�b/H�0�Rf�39��ƅ�(q���\Dh�ؖ�Ia�^��aT�,���4�����8�J��*q\���������:O�N�k�;�D62Aú�w���-���q��,k_�o�ҟ�NX̾��K�k�:�Q�ßu/f�EKg@q(����-��*���[h��;"�I3��G�Se!|�e�=��C7&Fl���4=��(�7.Xz�`~�M�� Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1968), pp. x�uXY��8~ϯ�[��Z�|�e��^S�E��>��qc|�>:��I�I��KDK��#E����?U�{Y��e�y��մ
�(��a��}���&����T��ԯ���o +�� The idea that the principles of logic might be susceptible to revision on empirical grounds has many roots, including the work of W.V. Putnam understands realism about physical objects as involving that the properties of momentum and position exist for quanta. Quine did not at first seriously pursue this argument, providing no sustained argument for the claim in that paper. No. In an article also titled "Is logic empirical?," Michael Dummett argues that Putnam's desire for realism mandates distributivity: the principle of distributivity is essential for the realist's understanding of how propositions are true of the world, in just the same way as he argues the principle of bivalence is. is the title of two articles that discuss the idea that the algebraic properties of logic may, or should, be empirically determined; in particular, they deal with the question of whether empirical facts about quantum phenomena may provide grounds for revising classical logic as a consistent logical rendering of reality. Repr. I shall argue that the answer to this question is in the affirmative, and that logic is, in a certain sense, a natural science. /Length 1863 Another example of complementary properties are those of having a precisely observed position or momentum.
is logic empirical
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